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HEALTH CARE REFORM: TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS
INFORMATION NATIONWIDE
Robert B Leflar
Most of the debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA) and its implementation has centered on access issues: expansion
of access to care among the uninsured and underinsured through insurance
reforms. True enough, increasing access to care is the law’s chief goal. But
the law’s architects and the new programs’ builders aspired to broader objectives. They also sought to advance health care quality and to restrain
health care inflation by helping rationalize the practice of medicine.
This paper focuses on the law’s attempts, largely ignored in the national debate, to reduce the amount of non-productive, expensive waste in
American health care practices, enabling us to deploy our limited resources
on what actually improves people’s health.
It is clear from comparative international statistics (see Figures 1 and 2) that
virtually every other advanced nation operates its health care system with
greater efficiency than we operate ours. Further, health care costs have been
rising in the United States far more quickly than inflation generally, so that
an average family of four paid $5,800 for health insurance in 1999, but just
fourteen years later paid more than $16,000 (Figure 3)—an inflation rate far
outstripping health cost increases in other countries. (Thankfully, the rate of
increase of health care inflation seems to be abating recently.)1 International
price comparisons for particular procedures and drugs bring home the radical cost differences to patients needing those procedures or drugs: Americans pay far more than patients in other advanced nations.2

* Ben J. Altheimer Professor of Legal Advocacy, University of Arkansas School of
Law, Fayetteville, Ark.; Professor, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock;
rbleflar@uark.edu. I thank the UALR Law Review editors for organizing the February 2014
symposium on the Affordable Care Act at which I gave the presentation on which this article
is based, Lauren Summerhill for dedicated research assistance, and Frank Griffin, Doug
Kamerow, and Mick Tilford for their useful suggestions.
1. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Health Care Spending─A Giant Slain or Sleeping?, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2551, 2551 (2013) (observing slower growth in health care costs
in 2012 but concluding continued cost control efforts are needed).
2. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill: Colonoscopies Explain Why U.S. Leads the World in Health Expenditures, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2013, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-us-leads
-the-world-in-health-expenditures.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

606

2014]

HEALTH CARE REFORM

607

Fig. 1. Percentage of Gross Domestic Product Spent on Health Care, 2012.3

Fig. 2. Health Care Expenditures per Person-Year, 2011.4

3. Quick Reports, Global Health Expenditure Database, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Key_Indicators/Index/en (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); Countries: Sri Lanka, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/countries/lka/en/ (last visited
November 12, 2014).
4. OECD Indicators, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2013, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION &
DEV., at 155 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf.
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Fig. 3. Average Annual Premiums for Single and Family Coverage,
1999−2013.5
What do we get for what we spend? In comparison with other countries, the picture in public health terms looks mostly, but not entirely, bleak.6
The figures below depict several dimensions on which health outcomes can
be compared. These are measures to which the quality of the health care
systems contributes some, but not all, of the differences among nations.7
Perhaps the most disturbing is Figure 9, depicting the relative improvement
among leading nations over a 20-year period in life expectancy at birth. The
United States rests at the bottom.

5. Average Annual Premiums for Single and Family Coverage, 1999−2013, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/2013-ehbs1-11.png (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
6. See, e.g., Karen Davis et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of
the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally, COMMONWEALTH FUND, at 7 (2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirror-mirror (ranking the U.S. “last or near last” among eleven advanced nations on dimensions of health care
performance such as health outcomes, access, efficiency, and equity).
7. For some measures, such as infant mortality and life expectancy at birth, a country’s
educational level, dietary practices, extent of income inequality, and other environmental
factors contribute as well.
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Fig. 4. Infant Mortality Rates, Internationally and by State.8

Fig. 5. Hospital Admission Rates for Diabetes Complications.9

8. T.J. Mathews & Marian F. MacDorman, Infant Mortality Statistics from the 2009
Period Linked Birth/Infant Death Data Set, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., at 1, 17 (Jan. 24, 2013),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_08.pdf (state comparisons);
The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2012), available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html (international comparisons). In addition to the quality of health care systems, other factors such as nutrition, education, and relative income inequality contribute to these statistics.
9. OECD Indicators, supra note 2, at 109.
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Fig. 6. In-Hospital Mortality for Acute Myocardial Infarction (Heart Attacks).10

Fig. 7. Breast Cancer 5-year Relative Survival Rates.11

10. OECD Indicators, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION &
DEV., at 109 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/49105858.pdf (Fig. 5.3.1).
11. Id. at 121 (Figure 5.9.2).
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Fig. 8. Life Expectancy at Birth, 2011.12

Fig. 9. Increase in Life Expectancy at Birth, 1988-2008.13
The conclusion that must be drawn from these comparative statistics is
that America spends enormous quantities of money on health care, far more
12. OECD, OECD Factbook 2014: Economic, Environmental, and Social Statistics,
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., at 237 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/factbook2014-en.
13. OECD, OECD Health Data 2010 (2010), reproduced in Gerard F. Anderson & Patricia Markovich, Multinational Comparisons of Health Systems Data 2010, COMMONWEALTH FUND, at 61 (2010).
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than any other nation, but a substantial proportion of that massive amount of
spending does little if any good.14 Excess administrative costs, duplicative
lab tests, unnecessary procedures and diagnostics, procedures to repair previous mistakes, the list goes on: American health care is replete with highcost, low-value services.15 Certainly, at the top level, the quality of sophisticated health care in the United States is frequently second to none. But for
what we pay, looking at national health outcomes statistics, on the whole we
are not getting a good return on our investment. As the Institute of Medicine
recently concluded, “[t]he growth rate of health care expenditures is unsustainable, with waste that diverts major resources from necessary care and
other priorities at every level─individual, family, community, state, and
national.”16
What are the reasons for the inefficiency and limited effectiveness of
our health care system? There are many. As Dr. Dan Rahn observed in his
keynote presentation at this symposium, “Systems are perfectly designed to
get the results they get.”17 Perhaps the most important structural reason is
that up to now, the amount of payment that providers receive for their services and that medical product merchants receive for their products has depended chiefly on quantity, not quality. What matters financially is the
amount of services and products provided, not the health outcomes for patients.18 Since physicians control most health care purchasing decisions, and
they have not been constrained in most health care settings by cost considerations, incentives for excessive diagnostic tests and other procedures are
built into the system.
Atul Gawande’s provocative article, “The Cost Conundrum,” depicted
how in some areas a culture of profit rather than professionalism has come
to dominate local health care.19 Gawande focused on the second-highest-cost
metropolitan area in the U.S.—McAllen, Texas of all places—and compared
14. See generally U.S. HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES,
POORER HEALTH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Aron eds.,
2013), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2013/US-Health-in-International-Perspective
-Shorter-Lives-Poorer-Health.aspx.
15. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 101−05 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013). The Institute of
Medicine’s prestigious history as an authoritative source of information on health care policy
lends particular weight to its conclusions about waste in health care expenditures.
16. Id. at 14, 104.
17. Dr. Rahn, Chancellor, Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., Keynote Address at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Ben J. Altheimer Symposium on the Affordable Care Act
(Feb. 28, 2014) (quoting Dr. Paul Batalden of Dartmouth Medical School and the Institute for
Health Improvement).
18. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 25.
19. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-condundrum.
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it to El Paso, another Texas border city similar in demographics, income,
and medical facilities. Critically ill Medicare patients in McAllen received
almost 50% more specialist visits than in El Paso. McAllen patients got
“thirty per cent more bone-density studies, sixty per cent more stress tests
with echocardiography, . . . and five hundred and fifty per cent more urineflow studies to diagnose prostate troubles.”20 McAllen patients got two to
three times as many cardiac procedures such as pacemaker and defibrillator
implants, cardiac bypass operations, and coronary artery stents. Those differences in number of treatments and amount of costs could not be explained by differences in the patients’ conditions. Gawande’s conclusion:
“The primary cause of McAllen’s extreme costs was, very simply, the
across-the-board overuse of medicine.”21
McAllen is but one striking example of how medical practice in the
United States is driven to a large degree by forces other than sound scientific
evidence.22 Instances abound of practice variations that cannot be explained
by medical logic or differences in patient health status. As John Wennberg
and his colleagues at Dartmouth proved years ago, what treatment a patient
will get for a given condition often varies tremendously from one geographical location to another.23 These irrational practice variations in the Medicare
program indicate that considerable expenditures could be saved by the elimination of scientifically unsupported services.24 The practice variations per20. Id. at 38−39.
21. Id. at 39. For non-Medicare privately insured patients, the cost disparity between
McAllen and El Paso seems much less severe, though it still exists. See generally Luisa Franzini et al., McAllen and El Paso Revisited: Medicare Variations Not Always Reflected in the
Under-Sixty-Five Population, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2302 (2010).
22. The Institute of Medicine has concluded that less than half of all treatments provided
to American patients are based on clear scientific evidence. Report Brief, Initial National
Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research, INST. OF MED. (2009), www.iom.edu
/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities/CER%20r
eport%20brief%2008-13-09.ashx; MICHAEL CHERNEW & MARK FENDRICK, LEARNING WHAT
WORKS BEST: THE NATION’S NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN
HEALTH CARE (Institute of Medicine ed., March, 2007).
23. See, e.g., John E. Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health
Care Delivery: A Population-Based Health Information System Can Guide Planning and
Regualtory Decision-Making, 182 SCI. 1102 (1973); see generally The Trustees of Dartmouth
College, Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care System, THE
DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (indicating extensive
practice variations persist today); see, e.g., Report to the Congress, Regional Variation in
Medicare Service Use, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (January, 2011),
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Jan11_RegionalVariation_report.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
24. See, e.g., JOHN E. WENNBERG, TRACKING MEDICINE: RESEARCHER’S QUEST TO
UNDERSTAND HEALTH CARE 5 (Oxford University Press 2010) (40% savings estimate); Elliott
S. Fisher, Medical Care—Is More Always Better? 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1665 (2003) (30%
savings estimate). The cost effectiveness of inpatient care for acute myocardial infarctions
(heart attacks), for example, ranges across hospitals from about $5,000 per life year saved to
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sist in some cases because of the lack of good evidence for the superiority of
one treatment modality over alternative treatments, and in other cases despite clear evidence that one treatment is preferable.25 Sometimes the variations are influenced by financial conflicts of interest, as when a physician
has a stake in an imaging center or receives payments or other values from
medical products companies.26 One recent report, for instance, found that
for-profit dialysis chains use significantly more injectable medications compared to nonprofits, at higher costs, but their patients have a higher risk of
dying.27 Another study indicated that a high-cost, high-reimbursement hip
fracture fixation device has largely displaced an older, cheaper, and safer
method among younger orthopedic surgeons.28 A broad-based study of drug
effectiveness suggested that many older drugs, generally available now in
cheaper generic form, outpaced newer (and more expensive) drugs in effectiveness terms.29 As the Institute of Medicine concluded, “[t]he prevailing
approach to paying for health care, based predominantly on individual services and products, encourages wasteful and ineffective care.”30

more than $100,000. Dana Goldman et al., Harnessing the Promise of Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2012/09/12/harnessing-the-promise-of-comparative-effectiveness-research/; cf. Andrew J.
Rettenmaier & Zijun Wang, Regional Variations in Medical Spending and Utilization: A
Longitudinal Analysis of US Medicare Population, 21 HEALTH ECON. 67, 80−81 (2012) (other scholars offering lower savings estimates).
25. See, e.g., Justin W. Timbie et al., Five Reasons That Many Comparative Effectiveness Studies Fail to Change Patient Care and Clinical Practice, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2168, 2168
(2012) (“translating evidence into changes in clinical practice is rarely rapid”).
26. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Policy,
41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 544 (2013); Sunita Sah & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Physicians under
the Influence: Social Psychology and Industry Marketing Strategies, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
665, 666−67 (2013).
27. Yi Zhang et al., Organizational Status of Dialysis Facilities and Patient Outcome:
Does Higher Injectable Medication Use Mediate Increased Mortality? 48 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 949, 964 (2013).
28. See Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice, 90 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 700
(2008). See also Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, Spinal Fusions Serve as Case Study for
Debate over When Certain Surgeries Are Necessary, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/spinal-fusions-serve-as-case-study-fordebate-over-when-certain-surgeries-are-necessary/2013/10/27/5f015efa-25ff-11e3-b3e9d97fb087acd6_story.html (reporting on rise in expensive spinal fusion surgeries despite
sparse evidence of superiority over alternative cheaper treatments).
29. See Sharon Begley, New Drugs Trail Many Old Ones in Effectiveness Against Disease, REUTERS, June 3, 2013, available at www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL2N0EC1
E720130603 (reporting on Mark Olfson & Steven C. Marcus, Decline in Placebo-Controlled
Trial Results Suggests New Directions for Comparative Effectiveness Research, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 1116 (2013)).
30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 25.
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In response to concerns about high-cost, low-value care, a significant
movement is gaining steam to shift from a “pay-for-volume” approach to a
“pay-for-performance” approach.31 This shift is backed by the Affordable
Care Act’s provisions encouraging the formation of “Accountable Care Organizations” (ACOs), which are physician-led entities, physician-hospital
partnerships, and hospital-led partnerships that are rewarded by Medicare
for meeting targets of high-quality care and outcomes for the patients attributed to them, while keeping the cost of caring for those patients within
benchmarks set in advance.32 Initial results indicate that ACOs have
achieved significant cost savings, and the number of ACOs has risen rapidly
since the new law’s enactment.33 Concerns do exist on the one hand that
federal quality standards may be unrealistically strict,34 and on the other that
the emphasis on cost savings may compromise quality of care and that some
ACOs may attempt to meet their targets by discouraging sicker patients
from seeking treatment at their facilities.35 However, at present no empirical
data are reported to substantiate these concerns.36
31. Arkansas is a leader in this respect. See Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative
(APII), ARK. CENTER FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT, http://www.achi.net/Pages/OurWork/
Project.aspx?ID=47.
32. See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Making Good on ACOs’ Promise─The Final Rule for
the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1111671; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
15, at 239−42. A recent survey found that the vast majority of ACOs are physician-led or
jointly led by physicians and hospitals. Carrie H. Colla et al., First National Survey of ACOs
Finds that Physicians Are Playing Strong Leadership and Ownership Roles, 33 HEALTH AFF.
964 (2014), available at http://www.statecoverage.org/files/HA_Physicians_in_ACOs_
Survey.pdf (51% of ACOs physician-led, 33% jointly physician- and hospital-led, 3% solely
hospital-led; but surgeons reluctant to participate).
33. See, e.g., John Reichard, New Savings Figures Buoy Hopes for Potential of Medicare ACOs, WASH. HEALTH POL’Y WEEK IN REV., Feb. 3, 2014 (reporting preliminary savings
of about $400 million the first year, shared by providers and the Medicare program),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-inreview/2014/feb/february-3-2014/new-savings-figures-buoy-hopes-for-potential-of-medicareacos; J. Michael McWilliams et al., Changes in Patients’ Experiences in Medicare Accountable Care Organizations, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1715 (2014) (finding cost savings and some
quality improvements in Medicare ACOs); Lawrence P. Casalino, Accountable Care Organizations—The Risk of Failure and the Risks of Success, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1750 (2014)
(noting positive results of McWilliams study, supra, and other studies).
34. See, e.g., John Reichard, CMS Letter on Quality Standards Aims to Keep Pioneer
ACOs from Bolting, WASH. HEALTH POL’Y WEEK IN REV., Apr. 29, 2013 (reporting pioneer
ACOs’ objections to costly federal standards), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-in-review/2013/apr/apr-29-2013/cmsletter-on-quality-standards.
35. ACO proponents respond that these latter concerns should be mitigated by the fact
that physicians, not insurers, occupy a leadership role in ACOs, so physicians’ training and
ethic of patient care should serve to keep quality-of-care principles at the forefront. Much
may depend, however, on the confidence that ACO leaders have in the accuracy of risk ad-
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To succeed in the endeavor of reducing low-value, high-cost services,
what providers and their patients need is good comparative information
about both outcomes and costs: what treatments and procedures are superior
in clinical effectiveness, and what treatments and procedures are costeffective. That kind of information is surprisingly hard to come by.37
Addressing the problems of excessive practice variation and the prevalence of high-cost, low-value services and products, health reform advocates
proposed creation of a Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute to clarify and publicize evidence about best clinical practices. With power to influence Medicare payment decisions, reform advocates argued, the Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute could be “the silver crowbar to bend
the healthcare cost curve without compromising quality.”38
As a rational health policy plan, the Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute proposal had much to recommend it. As a political matter,
however, the proposal generated a storm of controversy.39 Opponents expressed fears that such an entity would foist cookbook, “one-size-fits-all”
medicine on the public. They raised fears that the entity would ration care—
that it would shut off payments for treatment modalities preferred by doctors
and patients but disfavored by cost-conscious bureaucrats, thereby restricting physician autonomy and undercutting biomedical innovation.40 Opponents charged that the entity might arrive at these decisions through secretive unaccountable processes. They expressed fears that it would undervalue
the lives of the old, the disabled, and the terminally ill—the specter of Sarah
Palin’s “death panels.”41
justment techniques used in setting ACO achievement benchmarks. Personal communication
from Mark McClellan, Director, Health Care Innovation & Value Initiative, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, in Tokyo, Japan, July 7, 2014.
36. Id.
37. See CHERNEW & FENDRICK, supra note 22.
38. Eleanor D. Kinney, Prospects for Comparative Effectiveness Research under Federal Health Reform, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 79, 84 (2012) [hereinafter Kinney, Prospects].
39. For a comprehensive analysis of the development of comparative effectiveness research, its incorporation into the 2010 health reform law, its potential for transforming health
care, and the concerns it has raised among various stakeholders in the health care marketplace, see Eleanor D. Kinney, Comparative Effectiveness Research under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Can New Bottles Accommodate Old Wine? 37 AM. J. L. &
MED. 522 (2011) [hereinafter Kinney, Old Wine].
40. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 42, S1883 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon
Kyl criticizing comparative effectiveness research entities for potentially enabling government rationing of health care); Corinna Sorenson et al., The Politics of Comparative Effectiveness Research: Lessons from Recent History, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 139, 140, 142
(2014) (recounting opposition arguments).
41. See Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7,
2009, 3:26 PM), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=113851103434 (Palin’s Facebook post raising specter of “Obama’s ‘death panel’”).
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As Daniel Callahan,42 Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,43 and Alan Maynard44
among others have pointed out, the idea of top-down rationing is unpopular
on this side of the Atlantic. Public opinion research has amply documented
Americans’ relative distrust of government, compared, for example, with
European nations with a strong history of government involvement in health
care, such as the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries.45
What to keep in mind, however, is that we Americans ration health care
anyway. At one level, we ration it by limited access to health insurance.46 At
a second level, we ration it by insurance company employees deciding
which treatments get paid for, and which are not covered by the insurance
policy.47 Limited resources and high demand inevitably result in rationing of
one kind or another; rationing of health care cannot be avoided. The question is how it should be done.
Notwithstanding public reaction against fictional government “death
panels,” comparative effectiveness research efforts drew support from both
sides of the aisle, Republicans as well as Democrats. Seeking at least partial
consensus on this topic amid the contentious ideological debate on the overall health reform package, PPACA drafters renamed the new entity. “Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute” was thought to raise too many
hackles, especially among politically active and generous promoters in the
drug and medical device industries of treatments that might be found lacking
in comparative effectiveness. So instead, the PPACA drafters dubbed the
new entity the “Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute” (PCORI).48
They re-cast the new entity as a non-governmental organization, funded by a
42. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, The Graying of America: Challenges and Controversies:
Must We Ration Health Care for the Elderly? 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 10 (2012).
43. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L.J.
872 (2013).
44. Alan Maynard, Health Care Rationing: Doing It Better in Public and Private Health
Care Systems, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1103 (2013).
45. For a country-by-country overview of public trust levels toward government in the
European Union, see Report, Future of Europe, TNS OPINION & SOCIAL 22−31 (2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_379_en.pdf (reporting very high trust
levels in Scandinavian nations and medium levels in the United Kingdom). For statistics on
declining public trust in government in the United States, see Public Trust in Government,
1958−2013, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (2014), http://www.peoplepress.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-interactive/. Peter Neumann’s analysis of the issue
has been influential. Peter J. Neumann, Why Don’t Americans Use Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 308 (2004).
46. The 2010 health care reform law, to the extent its access provisions are being implemented by the states, is starting to alleviate this problem.
47. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 43, at 874−79.
48. For accounts of the congressional debate over creation of the new entity, see
Sorenson et al., supra note 40, at 141−43; Leonard, supra note 43, at 883−86; and Kavita
Patel, Health Reform’s Tortuous Route to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute,
29 HEALTH AFF. 1777 (2010).
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mixture of public and private money. Its board is composed of four government agency representatives and seventeen representatives of private stakeholders such as patients, providers, insurers, manufacturers, and researchers.
The law defined the Institute’s mission as to
assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of evidence concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other
health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed through research and evidence
synthesis that considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the dissemination of research findings.49

As part of the political maneuvering to get PPACA passed, Congress
put rather strict limitations on what PCORI can do with the information it
gathers.50 The Institute is prohibited from making determinations or even
recommendations about insurance coverage, and from using the results of its
research to promote practice guidelines. Nor may the Secretary of Health
and Human Services use the Institute’s research findings “in a manner that
treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as
of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, not
disabled, or not terminally ill.”51 Another provision of the law prohibits the
use of the concept of “Quality-Adjusted Life Years” or QALYs,52 a concept
that is routinely employed53 by health economists, by health policy leaders,
and by the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence,54 but that is specifically off-limits for PCORI’s scientists and
scholars.55

49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 728 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(c) (2012)).
50. One commentator has characterized the result as Congress having “cut [PCORI] off
at the knees.” Leonard, supra note 43, at 881. See also Maynard, supra note 44, at 1120 (“the
Obama institute is like a carriage without a horse, as PCORI is not permitted to conduct costeffectiveness analyses”).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(c) (2012), added by PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 6301(c),
124 Stat. 740.
52. Id. § 1320e-1(e) (2012).
53. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 (2006).
54. See, e.g., Richard Cookson, Can the NICE “End-of-Life Premium” Be Given a Coherent Ethical Justification? 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1132 (2013) (“[t]he specific metric NICE uses to measure health benefits is the ‘quality adjusted life year (QALY)’”);
Maynard, supra note 44, at 1122−23.
55. For a summary of the limitations on PCORI’s activities, see Kinney, Old Wine,
supra note 39, at 556−57. See also Peter J. Neumann & Milton C. Weinstein, Legislating
against Use of Cost-Effectiveness Information, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1495 (2010) (explain-
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The clinical effectiveness of treatment is considered a proper subject
for the Institute’s research; the cost-effectiveness of treatment is not. Barred
from direct influence on government reimbursement policy, the new Institute must fulfill its more limited mission through the effective production,
gathering, and dissemination of research results to the medical profession
and the general public.
There is much that can be accomplished, however, even within that
limited scope, to rationalize medical practice. PCORI has been up and running for three years. It has received strong funding56 and has launched almost 200 studies “spanning the spectrum of clinical conditions.”57 Its studies
tend to concern issues of broad applicability, such as preventing fall-related
injuries in the elderly, interventional pain management, and aligning primary and specialty care for older adults with complex chronic conditions.58 A
notable feature of these studies is the involvement of patient and family advisory councils and health systems in their design and governance, with a
view to enhancing the translation of study results into clinical practice and
public awareness.59
It is too early to assess the fruitfulness of PCORI’s activities. As yet, its
studies are thought to have had little impact, according to a recent survey. 60
And when the studies are completed, they may not directly inform the basis
of Medicare payment decisions. But the studies’ results will be accompanied
by publicity to professionals, to the public—and to health insurance companies, which no doubt will make use of them in private coverage decisions
and strategies. Moreover, the research PCORI sponsors is complemented by
a considerable number of private and professional comparative effectiveness
initiatives, such as the “Choosing Wisely” campaign sponsored by the
American Board of Internal Medicine.61 If the results of the PCORIsponsored studies and their privately sponsored analogues can be incorpoing usefulness of cost-per-QALY ratios and lamenting the health reform law’s possible
“chilling effect” on cost-effectiveness research).
56. See Kinney, Prospects, supra note 38, at 83 (noting large congressional authorizations for comparative effectiveness research).
57. Joseph V. Selby & Steven H. Lipstein, PCORI at 3 Years─Progress, Lessons, and
Plans, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592, 593 (2014).
58. Information about the variety of studies funded is available on the PCORI website,
http://www.pcori.org/news-room/landing/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
59. Harlan M. Krumholz & Joe V. Selby, Seeing through the Eyes of Patients: The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute Funding Announcements, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 446 (2012).
60. See John Reichard, Rapid Payoff from Comparative Effectiveness Research Questioned, WASH. HEALTH POL’Y WEEK IN REV. (May 27, 2014), http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-in-review/2014/may/may-272014/rapid-payoff-from-comparative.
61. Nancy E. Morden et al., Choosing Wisely—The Politics and Economics of Labeling
Low-Value Services, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 589 (2014).
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rated into the daily processes of care—no small task—then the wasteful
inefficiencies plaguing American health care can be at least partially mitigated.
Ours is an information-driven society, relentlessly becoming more so.
Despite existing barriers (financial, psychological, and ideological) to adoption of treatments proven superior,62 in the long run the evidence should
have an effect. Bioethicist John Marquis has suggested asking any taxpayer,
“Should you continue paying taxes to fund expensive treatments lacking
evidence that they work as well as cheaper available treatments?”63 When
that conversation takes hold in public discourse, it will build popular support
for cost-effectiveness as a pillar of health policy.

62. See, e.g., Timbie et al., supra note 25 (suggesting various reasons for slow pace of
change in clinical practice).
63. Marquis’s suggestion is reported in Leonard, supra note 43, at 886.

